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P r e f a c e  
S tandard  s e t t i n g  i s  one of t h e  most commonly used r e g u l a t o r y  
t o o l s  t o  l i m i t  d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  of  t e chno log i e s  on human 
h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  and p sycho log i ca l  wel l -being.  S t anda rds  a l s o  
work a s  a  major c o n s t r a i n t  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  development,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  energy  f i e l d .  The t r a d e - o f f s  which have t o  
be made between economical ,  eng inee r i ng ,  env i ronmenta l ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  h igh  u n c e r t a i n t y  abou t  env i ronmenta l  
e f f e c t s ,  and t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  o f  groups  invo lved  i n  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g ,  make t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  t a s k  exceed ing ly  d i f f i c u l t .  
R e a l i z i n g  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  t n e  Volkswagen ~ o u n d a t i o n  spon- 
so r ed  a  r e s e a r c h  s u b t a s k  i n  IIASA's Energy Program under t h e  name 
P r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  S t a n d a r d s .  The o b j e c t i v e  
of t h i s  r e s e a r c h  a r e  t o  ana lyze  e x i s t i n g  procedures  f o r  s t a n d a r d  
s e t t i n g  an5 t o  deve lop  new techn iques  t o  improve t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  
d e c i s i o n  making p roce s s .  The r e s e a r c h  performed under t h i s  
p r o j e c t  i ne lude :  
i )  p o l i c y  a n a l y s e s  of t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  and camparisons w i t h  o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  
t o o l s ,  
ii) c a s e  s t u d i e s  of ongoing o r  p a s t  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
p roce s se s  ( e . g . ,  o i l  d i s c h a r g e  s t a n d a r d s  o r  n o i s e  
s t a n d a r d s )  ; 
iii) development o f  fo rmal  methods f o r  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
based on game and d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y ;  
i v )  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e s e  methods t o  r e a l  wor ld  s t a n d a r d  
s e t t i n g  problems. 
The p r e s e n t  r e s e a r c h  memorandum i s  one i n  a  series of  pape r s  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  development and a p p l i c a t i o n  of  game- theore t i c  
models f o r  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  I t  p r e s e n t s  an i l l u s t r a t i v e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of a  model develope6 a t  TIASA t o  t h e  problem o f  
s e t t i n g  r a i lway  n o i s e  s t a n d a r d s .  

A b s t r a c t  
T h i s  paper  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  a  m u l t i s t a g e  game 
t h e o r e t i c a l  model t o  s e t t i n g  n o i s e  s t a n d a r d s  which i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by t h e  c a s e  o f  t r a i n s .  The problem was s t r u c t u r e d  t o  match t h e  
d e c i s i o n  problem which t h e  Environment Agency f a c e d  when s e t t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  f o r  Shinkansen t r a i n s .  The model c o n s i d e r s  t h r e e  p lay-  
ers: t h e  r e g u l a t o r  (environment agency ) ,  t h e  producer  ( r a i l w a y  
c o r p o r a t i o n ) ,  and t h e  impactees  ( r e s i d e n t s  a l ong  t h e  r a i lway  l i n e  
who s u f f e r  from n o i s e ) .  The game ha s  seven s t a g e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  impactees  r ang ing  from p e t i t i o n s  t o  l e g a l  
l i t i g a t i o n .  The f i n a l  s t a g e s  a r e  t h e  outcomes o f  a  p o s s i b l e  law- 
s u i t .  The c a s e  i s  e i t h e r  won by t h e  producer  o r  t h e  impactees ,  
o r  a compromise i s  reached.  T r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  between 
s t a g e s  a r e  cons ide r ed  pa ramete r s  of t h e  game. They depend mainly 
on t h e  n o i s e  l e v e l  t h e  impactees  c o n s i d e r  a c c e p t a b l e ,  t h e  s t a n -  
da r d  set by t h e  r e g u l a t o r ,  and t h e  a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  n o i s e  emi t t ed .  
Only t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  producer  a r e  a c t i v e  p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  
s ens e  t h a t  t hey  have a set  of  c h o i c e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  s t a n d a r d  
l e v e l s  ( r e g u l a t o r )  and n o i s e  p r o t e c t i o n  measures (p roducer )  . 
The impactees  a r e  modeled 3s a  respor.se f l lnc t ion .  S e v e r a l  so- 
l u t i o n s  acco rd ing  t o  a  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  concep t  o f  t h e  game 
a r e  d e r i v e d .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  g iven  under which t h e  
r e g u l a t o r  o r  t h e  producer  would p r e f e r  a  compromise s o l u t i o n  t o  
awa i t i ng  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  c o u r t  c a se .  These c o n d i t i o n s  can  be 
exp r e s s ed  d i r e c t l y  a s  f u n c t i o n s  of n o i s e  l e v e l s  and t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  g iven  some s imple  assumpt ions  abou t  t h e  shape o f  
t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  producer .  

A DYNAMIC MODEL FOR SETTING 
RAILWAY NOISE STANDARDS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
S i n c e  t h e  supe r r ap id  " b u l l e t  t r a i n " ,  t h e  Shinkansen,  be- 
gan o p e r a t i o n s  i n  Japan i n  1964, compla in t s  abou t  t r a i n  n o i s e  
have never ceased ,  Peak n o i s e  l e v e l s  can  r e a c h  over  100 dB lead-  
i n g  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i s t u r b a n c e s  of r e s i d e n t i a l  l i v i n g .  S ince  
t h e  r e s pons e s  of  t h e  government and t h e  r a i lway  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  
t h e s e  compla in t s  have been slow, c i t i z e n s  began t o  go th rough  
v a r i o u s  forms of p r o t e s t ,  i n c l u d i n g  p e t i t i o n s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
and l e g a l  l i + . i g a t i o n .  I n  1972 t h e  government asked t h e  r a i l w a y  
c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  t a k e  u r g e n t  s t e p s  a g a l n s t  ~ h i n k a n s e n  n o i s e .  But 
it was no t  u n t i l  1975 t h a t  n o i s e  s t a n d a r d s  (70-75 dB) w e r e  i s s u e d  
t o  f o r c e  t h e  r a i l w a y  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  respond t o  t h e  c i t i z e n s '  
need f o r  q u i e t n e s s .  Res iden t s ,  however, w e r e  not  c o n t e n t  w i t h  
t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  and t h e  r a i lway  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  subsequent  a t t e m p t s  
a t  improving sound p r o t e c t i o n  measures. A l e g a l  b a t t l e  between 
r e s i d e n t s  znd t h e  r a i l w a y  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  s t i l l  going on i n  which 
r e s i d e n t s  a s k  t o  reduce  Shinkanser,  n o i s e  t o  a  "nond i s t u rb ing"  
l e v e l .  
I n  a  r e c e n t  paper  ( s e e  [ I ] )  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p roce s s  of  t h e  
Environment Agency and t h e  r a i lway  c o r p o r a t i o n  w a s  des-  
c r i b e d  and ana lyzed .  I n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t h e  need was recogn ized  
f o r  more formal  methodologies  t o  s t u d y  d e c i s i o n  making i n v o l v i n g  
t h e  c o n f l i c t  between environmenta l  and developmental  i n t e r e s t s .  
The p r e s e n t  paper  i s  an  a t t emp t  a t  deve lop ing  such a  methodology 
based on dynamic game t h e o r e t i c  models.  The purpose  of  such  
models i s  t o  e x p l o r e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  of t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
a c t o r s  i n  environmenta l  s t anda rd  s e t t i n g  d e c i s i o n s ,  and t o  
d e r i v e  "op t imal"  s t r a t e g i e s  depending on t h e  pa ramete r s  of t h e  
game and a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n  concep t s .  
E s s e n t i a l l y  three groups  a r e  involved i n  t y p i c a l  environment- 
development c o n f l i c t s :  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ,  t h e  producer  ( deve lope r ) ,  
and t h e  impactee ( s u f f e r e r  o f  p o l l u t i o n ) .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of t r a i n  
n o i s e  t h e s e  groups  a r e  an  environmenta l  agency ( r e g u l a t o r ) ,  a  
r a i lw ay  c o r p o r a t i o n  ( p r o d u c e r ) ,  and t h e  r e s i d e n t s  a l ong  t h e  l i n e  
( impac t ee s ) .  Neg l ec t i ng  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r rangements ,  t h e  r egu l a -  
t o r  and t h e  producer  are cons ide r ed  s i n g l e  r a t i o n a l  p l a y e r s  f o r  
t h e  purposes  o f  t h e  model. The d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  a r e  
cons ide r ed  ( p o s s i b l y  p r o b a b i l i s t i c )  r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  producer .  Thus t h e  impactee  i s  n o t  
modeled a s  a  r a t i o n a l  p l a y e r  b u t  r a t h e r  a s  a  r e sponse  f u n c t i o n .  
The c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n  between r e g u l a t o r ,  producer ,  and r e s i d e n t s  
i s  f o r ma l i zed  as a m u l t i s t a g e  two-person game, where a  s t a g e  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  a c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  o r  a judgment by 
a c o u r t .  
2. THE MODEL 
Two-person dynamic o r  m u l t i s t a g e  ganes  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form 
(see [2]  o r  [ 3 ] )  a r e  r ega rded  t h a t  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  s t o c h a s t i c  
games. A t  each  s t a g e  a  component game of p e r f e c t  i n fo rma t ion  i s  
played t h a t  i s  comple t e ly  s p e c i f i e d  by a  s t a t e .  The p l a y e r s '  
c h o i c e s  d o  n o t  c o n t r o l  o n l y  t h e  payo f f s  b u t  a l s o  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  ~ o v e r n i n g  t h e  component game t o  be p layed  a t  
t h e  nex t  s t a g e .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  pro- 
ducer  have t h e  same e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
The s t a t e s  o f  t h e  game a r e  a s u b s e t  of  
where i i n d i c a t e s  t h e  l a s t  a c t i o n  o r  measure of t h e  r e s i d e n t s  o r  
t h e  c o u r t .  L d e n o t e s  an  upper bound f o r  t h e  admi t t ed  n o i s e  l e v e l ,  
- 
n  t h e  maximum v a l u e  o f  n o i s e  produced by t h e  t r a i n  w i thou t  s p e c i a l  
sound p r o t e c t i o n  measures ,  - n > o  t h e  minimum v a l u e  of  n o i s e  under 
which t h e  t r a i n  can  be r u n  under economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and 
(1,L) i s  t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e  a f t e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  r a i l w a y  l i n e .  
Hence (I L )  = ( I  , . S t a t e  ( 2 , L )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a  p e t i t i o n  ha s  
t a ken  p l ace .  (3 ,L)  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a f f e c t e d  by n o i s e  
h a s  b u i l t  up an  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  government 
i n  o r d e r  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  l o w  n o i s e  s t anda rd .  I f  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
f a i l  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  can s t a r t  a  l a w s u i t .  Th i s  i s  i n d i c a t e d  by 
( 4 , L ) .  ( 4 , L )  can  be  fo l lowed by s t a t e s  of  t y p e  ( 5 , L ) ,  ( 6 ,L ) ,  or 
( 7 , L ) .  (5 ,L)  s t a n d s  f o r  a  permanent compromise between a l l  pa r -  
t i e s  w i t h  upper  bound L  f o r  n o i s e .  (6,L) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  law- 
s u i t  was dec ided  i n  a n e u t r a l  or p o s i t i v e  way f o r  t h e  r a i l w a y  
c o r p o r a t i o n  and t h e  government,  and (7 ,L)  t h a t  t h e  l a w s u i t  was 
dec ided  i n  f avo r  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t s .  ( 5 , L ) ,  ( 6 , L ) ,  and (7 ,L)  a r e  
f i n a l  o r  absorb ing  s t a t e s .  See a l s o  F igure  1 .  For  each  c lass  of  
s t a t e s  t h e  component game and t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y  a r e  spec-  
i f i e d  s e p a r a t e l y .  
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F i g u r e  1 .  S t a t e s  o f  t h e  game and t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i -  
t i es  ( p i ) .  
The model assumes t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  of r e s t r i c t i n g  
o r  i n c r e a s i n g  n o i s e  l e v e l s  from t h e  t r a i n  can  be  exp re s sed  a s  
u t i l i t y  functions on n o i s e  l e v e l s .  The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
r a i l w a y  c o r p o r a t i o n  is  g iven  a s  
a s  long  a s  t h e r e  i s  no e f f e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by t h e  r e s i d e n t s .  I n  
g e n e r a l ,  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  w i l l  be s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g .  I n  f a c t ,  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  ev idence  t h a t  w i t h i n  r e a s o n a b l e  v a l u e s  of n  and i 
- 
(e .g .  6 0  and 100 dB, r e s p e c t i v e l y )  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  may be  l i n e a r  
(see [ I ] ) .  Thus i n  some c a s e s  it may be  p o s s i b l e  t o  e x p r e s s  
u ( n )  = n + e  , P 
n e g l e c t i n g  a  s c a l i n g  f a c t o r .  
The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r  is  a l s o  assumed t o  
b e  d e f i n e d  d i r e c t l y  on n o i s e  l e v e l s :  
u  i s  t o  r e f l e c t  a  compromise between t h e  economic impor tance  o f  R 
t h e  t r a i n  and t h e  n o i s e  p o l l u t i o n  e f f e c t s  on  r e s i d e n t s  a long  t h e  
l i n e .  I n  t h e  model u R  i s  assumed t o  be unimodal w i t h  a  peak a t  
n  < L+ < K. The fo l l owing  argument s u p p o r t s  t h e  assumpt ion 
- - - 
t h a t  uR i s  unimodal.  Assuming t h a t  uR b a l a n c e s  env i ronmenta l  
and developmenta l  i n t e r e s t s ,  a  c r u d e  approx imat ion  of  u cou ld  3 
be  g ive n  by 
where W > o  i s  a n  impor tance  we igh t  f a c t o r  which i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  we igh t  of economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and u I  i s  t h e  im-  
p a c t e e ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  From survey d a t a  [ 4 ,5 ]  one c a n  i n f e r  
t h a t  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of  c o m p l a i n t s  t o  n o i s e  (an  i n d i c a t o r  of u I )  
i s  a p p rox ima te ly  q u a d r a t i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  n o i s e  l e v e l .  Thus 
neglec t ing  s c a l i n g  f a c t o r s  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  U I  and u  i n  u g ives  P R 
+ W 
which i s  unimodal w i th  a  maximum a t  L = + g. 
I n  case  of t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e  ( I  , L )  = (1 ,ii) t h e  component 
game i s  s p e c i f i e d  a s  fo l lows .  F i r s t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  chooses h i s  
measure mREMR (1 ,K)  , where MR (1 ,z) denotes  t h e  set of measures 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  him. Knowing mR t h e  producer chooses m EM ( I  .E,mR) P P 
where Mp (1 , n , m R )  i s  t h e  s e t  of measures a v a i l a b l e  t o  him. MR 
and Mp a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
where 1 denotes  t h e  h ighes t  l e v e l  of no ise  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  allows, 
and n  t h e  va lue  of n o i s e  generated by ope ra t ing  t h e  ra i lway .  
The r e s i d e n t s '  choices  a r e  n o t  s p e c i f i e d  because they  a r e  formal- 
i zed  by a response f u n c t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  i n  s p e c i a l  t r a n s i t i o n  proba- 
1 b i l i t i e s .  
A s u b s t a n t i a l  p rope r ty  of t h e  model i s  t h e  assumption of a 
th re sho ld  n I ~ [ n I K ] ,  s o  t h a t  a n o i s e  l e v e l  below n  i s  n o t  con- 
- I 
s i d e r e d  a r e l e v a n t  d i s turbance  of t h e  r e s i d e n t s .  
- 
Given s t a t e  ( 3  ,;) only  s t a t e s  (1 ,a and (2,111 can succeed. 
Regulator and producer b e l i e v e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  
be 
where p2  > 0 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e x p e r t s '  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e  r e s i d e n t s  w i l l  choose a  p e t i t i o n  i f  n  > n  I ' The u t i l i t i e s  
a r e  g iven  by 
The s t a t e  ( 2 , n )  can e i t h e r  remain o r  be r ep l aced  by (3 ,n )  denot-  
ing  t h e  format ion of an  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  We assume t h e  fo l lcwing  
t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s :  
and 
where p3 > 0 .  The i d e a  i s  t h a t  n  < nI i s  genera ted  e i t h e r  by t h e  
- 
r e g u l a t o r  ( 1  2 n I )  o r  by t h e  producer ( n  1. "I < 1 )  g iv ing  i n  t o  t h e  
r e s i d e n t s 1  demands. The payof fs  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
U .  ( 2 , n , l , n )  : = u .  (n )  ( j  = RIP; 2 5 n  < 1) . 
3 I - 
I n  c a s e  of a  format ion of an o rgan iza t ion  (3 ,n )  r e s i d e n t s  
w i l l  begin n e g o t i a t i o n s  aimed a t  f o r c i n g  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  t o  g i v e  
i n  and s e t  an a c c e p t a b l e  s t anda rd .  Le t  t h e  measure s e t s  of t h e  
r e q u l a t o r  and t h e  producer be g iven  by 
Then 
where p4 > 0 and ( 4  ,n) d e n o t e s  t h e  s t a r t  of a  l a w s u i t .  L e t  
u j  (3 ,? i , l , n )  = u .  ( n )  ( j  = R , P :  n < n 2 1) . 3 - - 
Three outcomes of  a  l a w s u i t  a r e  cons ide r ed .  There i s  a 
compromise (5 ,L)  suspending t h e  l a w s u i t ,  o r  a  judgment i n  f a v o r  
of r e g u l a t o r  and producer  (6,L),  o r  a  judgment i n  f a v o r  of  t h e  
r e s i d e n t s  (7 , L )  . L e t  
( 1 , A )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  f i x e s  a  bound 1 f o r  t h e  n o i s e  
a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a g e  a n d a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  makes a  permanent com- 
mitment f o r  a  f i x e d  bound A i n  l a t e r  s t a g e s .  A cou ld  be  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  a s  a  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  t o  be  e f f e c t i v e  permanently a f t e r  
a  f i x e d  pe r i od  o f  t i m e  h a s  passed.  For  s i m p l i c i t y  w e  assume t h a t  
A becomes e f f e c t i v e  immediately.  Analogously n  i n  (n,N) deno t e s  
t h e  a c t u a l  n o i s e  l e v e l  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a g e ,  w h i l e  N deno t e s  a 
commitment made by t h e  producer  t o  r ega rd  t h i s  l i m i t  from now 
on.  L e t  
b e  c a l l e d  t h e  s e t  of compromise p a i r s  o f  c h o i c e s .  M c o n t a i n s  C 
I 
j u s t  t h e  p a i r s  ( m R f m p )  o f  measures  g u a r a n t e e i n g  t o  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  
t h a t  from now on no n o i s e  l e v e l  g r e a t e r  t h a n  n  w i l l  o c c u r ,  Then I 
w e  assume 
( 1  i f  ( m R I m p ) ~ M C  and L  = min ( A I N )  
- where A :  = + o r  N: = + a i n  
P (  (5 ,L)  141nImRrmp) c a s e  it i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  I 
( o else 
- p6 i f  L = nR and ( m R I  mp) # M ~  
P (  (6IL)  I 4 f n I m R I m p )  I 
9 else 
- 
p7 i f  L = n  I and ( m R I m p ) # ~ C  
p (  (7 .L)  )4 ,nImRImp)  = I 
0 else 
where - n 2 nI 5 n  < n h o l d s  f o r  t h e  maximal n o i s e  l e v e l  nR d e c r e e d  R - 
by a  c o u r t  judgment i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  p r o d u c e r ,  and  p6 + p7 need  
n o t  e q u a l  1. Hence 
The p a y o f f s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
S t a t e  (5 ,L)  means t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  h a s  a g r e e d  t o  t a k e  
L  5 nI a s  t h e  maximal level of n o i s e f o r  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c e r  h a s  
bound h i m s e l f  t o  n o i s e  l e v e l s  n o t  l a r g e r  t h a n  L - < nI.  L e t  t h e  
sets o f  measures  b e  g i v e n  by 
Then 
The ~ a y o f f  s a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
S t a t e  (6,nR) i n d i c a t e s  a  judgment un fa vo ra b l e  t o  t h e  r e s i d e n t s .  
L e t  
Then 
P ( ( 6 , n R )  ( 6 , n R , l , n )  = 1 and u . ( 6 . n R . l , n )  J = u .  3 ( n )  ( j  = R , P )  . 
S t a t e  ( 7 , n I )  d en o t e s  a  judgment un fa vo ra b l e  t o  r e g u l a t o r  
and producer .  L e t  
Then 
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  l o s t  l a w s u i t  t h e  p roduc e r ' s  and t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  
u t i l i t i e s  change. Th i s  i s  because  such a  judgment would have 
much wider reach ing  consequences t ha n  a  v o l u n t a r y  agreement t o  a 
s t a nda rd .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  implementa t ion  t im e ,  r u l e s  of  o p e r a t i o n ,  
e t c .  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  a  judgment would mean s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n  
o f  freedom t o  t h e  r a i lw ay  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Secondly,  t h e  s e n t e n c e  
would most l i k e l y  be  a p p l i e d  th roughout  t h e  r a i l w a y  network. 
Thus t h e  model assumes t h a t  
where cp < O i s  a  f i x e d  p e n a l t y  a s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e  sen tence .  
Also, t h e  r e g u l a t o r  s t a n d s  t o  l o s e  bo th  i n  p r e s t i g e  and i n  l o s t  
f l e x i b i l i t y  i f  t h e  c o u r t  should dec ide  i n  f avo r  of t h e  impactees.  
Again t h i s  l o s s  i s  expressed i n  h i s  u t i l i t y  func t ion .  
+ I n  t h e  c a s e  of L > n  it appears  n o t  unreasonable  t o  assume t h a t  I + 
c  ( j  = P , R )  i s  a  n e g a t i v e  m u l t i p l e  m of u  . ( L  j - u .  (n I )  , i . e .  j  j  I I 
A p lay  IT of t h e  game is given by an i n f i n i t e  sequence 
1 1  1 2 2 2  (s r m R t  mp; S t m R t m p ;  . . . ) of s t a t e s  and measures. We d e f i n e  
t h e  u t i l i t y  of a  p l ay  IT by t h e  d i scounted  i n f i n i t e  sum of t h e  
s t a g e  u t i l i t i e s  
where 0 < P < 1 i s  a  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r .  
The game i s  now complete ly  desc r ibed  except  f o r  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
of  s t r a t e g i e s  and t h e  s o l u t i o n  concept .  For s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  w e  
admit on ly  s t a t i o n a r y  s t r a t e g i e s  where t h e  c h o i c e s  depend on ly  on 
t h e  l a s t  s t a t e  and t h e  l a s t  measures of t h e  o t h e r  p l aye r s .  
D e f i n i t i o n :  A s t r a t e g y  oR of t h e  r e g u l a t o r  i s  a  map 
such t h a t  
where S d e n o t e s  t h e  s e t  of  s t a t e s .  
A s t r a t e g y  u p  of t h e  producer  i s  a  map 
such  t h a t  
The s e t s  of s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  denoted by C R  and Z p .  
1 1 1  For each s t r a t e g y  p a i r  ( o R I o p )  a  p l a y  n = (s  ,1 , n  : s2,12. 
- 
L 
n  ; . . . ) is realized. Since the strategies are s t a t i o n a r y ,  two components 
i i i i r ( S  ,1 , n  ) and ( s r , l r , n r )  a r e  equa l  a s  soon a s  s = s . By t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a t  most seven s t a t e s  
c a n  occur  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  g r e a t e r  t h a n  z e r o  and o n l y  one  w i l l  
b e  r e p e a t e d  i n f i n i t e l y  o f t e n .  From t h i s  it f o l l ow s  t h a t  t h e  
s e t  C(oR,op) o f  p o s s i b l y  r e a l i z e d  p l a y s  IT i s  f i n i t e  o r  denumer- 
a b l e .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  P  ( r r  1 o  0 ) f o r  neiI (oR! op) is given  as a n  
R ' P i + ~  i i 1 i n f i n i t e  p roduc t  of t h e  terms P ( s  Is ,1 , n  ) d e f i n e d  above. 
The payoff  o f  p l a y e r  ~ E { R , P }  i s  supposed t o  be h i s  expected  u t i l i t y  
o f  t h e  p lays :  
The s t r a t e g i e s  are t o  be determined accord ing  t o  t h e  fo l l ow ing  
s o l u t i o n  concept .  
D e f i n i t i o n :  A h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  is a  p a i r  ( T  T,) of  a R ' 
s t r a t e g y  T ~ E C ~  and a  map -rp : + C p  such t h a t  
3. THE GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTION 
I n  o r d e r  t o  keep t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  a s  sma l l  a s  p o s s i b l e  
w e  s h a l l  o n l y  d i s c u s s  h e u r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n s  which, however, can 
be  j u s t i f i e d  a s  soon a s  one e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  framework 
i n  f u l l  d e t a i l .  A t  l e a s t  p a r t  of  it can be  found i n  [TI .  
Because of t h e  d e f i n i t o n  o f  t h e  component game p a y o f f s  and t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  measures ( 1 , - 4 )  and ( 1 , n  ) ,  o r  I 
(n,N) and ( n , n I ) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  have t h e  same e f f e c t  i n  t h e  c a s e  
of  A < n,, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Th i s  a l s o  ho ld s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  1 and 
(1s) o r  n  and ( n , n ) .  Ilence, w i thou t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  w e  can 
reduce  t h e  measxre sets 2lR(4,G,mR) and MR 4 ,  t o  
- - - Since  t h e n  o n l y  t h e  s t a t e s  1 ,  , ( 2 , n ) ,  ( 3 , n ) ,  ( 4 , n )  , (5,n1) I 
( 6 , n R ) ,  (7,n1) can  o c c u r ,  t h e  s t a t e s  a r e  complete ly  f  ixnd by t h e i r  
f i r s t  component. W e  t h e r e f o r e  d rop  t h e  second component i n  a l l  t h e  
terms. 
For t h e  rest of t h e  paper  l e t  r b ( b  = 1 , .  . . , 7 )  deno t e  sub- 
games o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  game such t h a t  b i s t  t h e  f i r s t  state .  
Hence T i s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  game. r b ( b  = 5 , 6 , 7 )  ha s  o n l y  t h e  s t a t e  1  
b. I' (b  = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )  c o v e r s  s t a t e s  b ,  b  + 1  ,..., 7. Though i n  b  
p r i n c i p l e  one  has  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
rb w e  d e n o t e  by abuse  o f  n o t a t i o n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of ~ . E C  t o  rb I j  
by o j .  Le t  V j  , b  d e n o t e  t h e  payoff  f u n c t i o n  f o r  p l a y e r  j  i n  game 
rb. Without t h e  s imple  proof  w e  s t a t e  t h a t  
f o r  j = RIP. Now l e t  ( a R I o P )  ti) : = ( o R ( i )  , u P ( i I o R ( i )  (i = I ,. . , 7 ) .  
Then 
1 
where a i 4 , l , A )  d en o t e s  t h e  f i r s t  component of op (4 , 1 , A ) .  By F 
backward i t e r a t i o n  
Three  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  conce ivab le :  
(1 ) The r e g u l a t o r  can  e n f o r c e  h i s  maximum u t i l i t y ;  
( 2 )  1f r e g u l a t o r  and producer  have won t h e  l awsu i t ;  
+ 
t h e  r e g u l a t o r  h a s  t o  o f f e r  1 > L i n  o r d e r  t o  keep t h e  
producer  from compromising; 
( 3 )  I f  r e g u l a t o r  and producer  have won t h e  l a w s u i t ,  n o t  even 
the offer 1 = n can  keep t h e  producer from compromising. R 
~ h o u g h  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h r e e  s i t u -  
a t i o n s  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  any g i v e n  set of  v a l u e s  of  t h e  param- 
e t e r s ,  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  a s  a f u n c t i o n  
of t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  would r e q u i r e  a l o t  o f  space .  T h e r e f o r e  w e  con- 
s i d e r  o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  and t h e  t h i r d  s i t u a t i o n s .  The two c l a s s e s  
of  p a r a m e t e r s  g i v e n ,  however, do n o t  i n  g e n e r a l  e x h a u s t  t h e  se t  
of  a l l  t h e  parameter  v a l u e s  p o s s i b l e .  
A t  f i r s t  w e  e s t a b l i s h  a  p a i r  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  y i e l d i n g  t h e  
maximum u t i l i t y  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r .  
D e f i n i t i o n :  L e t  L+ > n  I ' The v e c t o r  o f  r e a l  numbers + 
L  , n I , n R , p I p 6 , p 7 )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  compromise c o n d i t i o n  o f  
p l a y e r  j  ( C , j )  i f  
h o l d s .  
A s  c a n  be  s e e n  by t h e  fo rmulae  above,  (C ,  j )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
a compromi.se i s  more a.dvantaqeous t o  p l a y e r  j .  
Theorem: L e t  @€IR and YcCp be d e f i n e d  by 
@ ( 6 )  : = min ( ~ + , n ~ )  
+ ( n I I n I )  i f  L  2 nI and ( C , R )  h o l d s  
@ ( 4 )  : = 
(L+,L+)  i f  L+ 2 nI o r  ( C , R )  i s  v i o l a t e d  
Then ( + , Y )  y i e l d s  t h e  maximal u t i l i t y  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r :  
I n  o r d e r  t o  avoid  a  l eng thy  and no t  i n s t r u c t i v e  proof w e  
o n l y  g i v e  t h e  i d e a  of t h e  p roof .  F i r s t  l e t  L+ 2 n  I ' Because 
of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of U ( i , m R , m p )  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  U R ( i , m R , m p )  < R + 
uR(L ho lds  f o r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e s  i and measures mR and mp. 
+ 
' u ( L  ) f o r  each ( a R , u p ) ~ L R  x L p .  ~ u t  Hence VR (OR; ~ p )  5 Fp R
u  (L+)  because  of + ( I )  = L+ and ~ ( 1 ( 1 , ( 6 ~ , Y ) ( l ) )  = 1. f 4  = R 
Now l e t  L+ > nI. Obviously VR (aR,uP)  2 v ( $ , I )  (j = 5 , 6 , 7 ) .  
, j R ,  j 
Then ( a R t  op) w i th  ( a R t  aP) (i) = ( 4  , Y )  i i = 5; 6,7)  maximizes 
V R f 4  (u,, op) i f  (aR,  aP) ( 4 )  = ( ( , Y )  ( 4 )  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
compromise c o n d i t i o n  ( C , R ) .  Hence V R t 4  ( aR t  ap)  < VR, ($, I ) .  
The f i n a l  s t e p  of  t h e  backward i t e r a t i o n  y i e l d s  VR ( a R t  up)  5 
V R ( @ ,  Y )  f o r  each p a i r  (aR,up)  &IR x Cp.  
I f  Y is  an op t imal  r e sponse  t o  Q , i .e. Vp ( Q ,  4 )  = sup  Vp 
C~ 
( $ , a p ) ,  it i s  n o t  impor tan t  t o  d e r i v e  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  
s i n c e  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  can en fo rce  h i s  maximum payoff .  
~ e f i n i t i o n  : The p a y ~ f f  v e c t o r  (VR (uR t  up) , Vp ( a R t  up)) is  
Pareto-opt imal  i f  t h e r e  i s  no o t h e r  s t r a t e g y  p a i r  ( ~ ; ( , U ~ E E ~ X C ~ )  
such t h a t  V .  (aR,  up) 5 V. ( o i , u i )  (j = R,P) and t h a t  a t  l e a s t  3 7 
one i n e q u a l i t y  is  s t r ic t .  
Theorem: Le t  ( ~ , Y ) E C ~ X C ~  be de f ined  as i n  t h e  p reced ing  
theorem. Then Y i s  an op t imal  response  t o  @, i . e .  Vp (0,Y) 2 
> v p ( $ , a p )  ( a p ~ C p )  , and V R ( @ , Y )  > VR(uR,up) (oR'CR, uP&ZP) if 
- 
one of t h e  fo l lowing  c o n d i t i o n s  ho ld s  
(ii) L+ > n, and ( C , R ) ;  
+ I (iii) L ,>  nI and n o t  o n l y  ( C , R )  b u t  a l s o  ( C , P J  i s  
v i o l a t e d .  
I n  t h e s e  c a s e s  ( V R ( @ .  Yo ,Vp ( 4  , Y ) )  i s  a pare to-opt imal  payoff 
v e c t o r .  
+ Sketched p r o o f :  Case (i)  : Because o f  $ ( 1 )  = L  < n  
1  P ( l l , ( $ , o p ) l )  = 1 .  Hence V p ( $ , o p )  = - - I+ 1-P u p ( o p ( l , L  1 )  + 
where op (1 ,L i 5 L+ i s  maximized by Y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  
+ 
a  g r e a t e r  payoff  V p ( y R , q p )  f o r  one s t a g e  a t  l e a s t  L  h a s  t o  
be  r e p l a c e d  by n  > L  . But t h e n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  payoff  is  
+ 
s m a l l e r  because  of  u R ( n )  < u R ( L  ) .  
Case (ii) : ~ ( 5  1 4 ,  ( $ , u p )  ( 4 ) )  = 1  because  of  $ ( 4 )  = ( n  , n I ) .  I 
By backward i t e r a t i o n  eva lua t ing  V p t i ( $ , o p ) ( i  = 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 )  
one immedia te ly  sees t h a t  Y maximizes V p ( $ , . ) .  The proof  o f  
t h e  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  re l ies  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n l y  s t r a t e g i e s  
a, w i t h  o R ( i )  = $ (i) (i = 1 , .  . . , 5 )  g i v e  maximal payoff  t o  t h e  
- - 
r e g u l a t o r .  The v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a c t  r e q u i r e s  a  l e n g t h y  
and u n i n s t r u c t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n  which w e  t h e r e f o r e  omi t .  
Case (iii) : Given $ t h e  assessment  Y (i,l) : = 1 (i = 5 , 6 , 7 )  
be longs  t o  an  op t tma l  r e s p o n s e  f o r  a l l  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  param- 
+ + 
eters.  Because o f  $ ( 4 )  = (L ,L ) and L+ > n  a  s t r a t e g y  op I + + 
maximizing V ($ ,  . )  t a k e s  e i t h e r  t h e  v a l u e  op (4 ,L  ,L ) = p,4  + + 
= ( n I , n I )  o r  t h e  v a l u e  ( L  ,L ) . Since  (C,P) i s  v i o l a t e d  t h e  
second assessment  y i e l d s  a  l a r g e r  u t i l i t y .  Hence Y maximizes 
V ( 4 ,  . )  . Then o b v i o u s l y  Y maximizes V p t i  ( $ , . I  (i = 3 , 2 , 1 )  . p , 4  
The P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  of  (VR($,  Y )  , Vp ( 4 ,  Y )  ) can  a g a i n  b e  ver i -  
f i e 6  by chang ing  some v a l u e s  o f  ( $ , Y ) ( i )  p rov ing  t h a t  t h e y  
r e d u c e  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  p a y o f f .  
I f  (C,P) h o l d s  and ( C , R )  i s  v i o l a t e d  t h e  s t r a t e g y  Y i s  g e n e r a l l y  
n o t  a n  o p t i m a l  r e s p o n s e  of $.  The s i t u a t i o n  can a r i s e  where t h e  
r e g u l a t o r  by r e d u c t i o n  of h i s  own payoff  can  f o r c e  t h e  maximizing 
p roducer  t o  a  no-compromise s t r a t e g y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  keep t h e  
a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  s m a l l  w e  o n l y  t r e a t  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  where t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  c a n n o t  a r i s e .  
- 
~ e f i n i t i o n :  The v e c t o r  ( n , n I , n R , n , p , p 6 , p 7 )  - s a t i s f i e s  t h e  
s t r i c t  compromise c o n d i t i o n  (SC) i f  
holds .  
(SC) can be i n t e r p r e t e d  by t h e  way t h a t  t h e  u tmost  o f f e r  and 
t h r e a t  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r  canno t  match t h e  v a l u e  of  a  compro- 
m i s e  f o r  t h e  producer .  
Theorem: L e t  (SC) ho ld .  A h i e r a r c h i c a l  s o l u t i o n  ( T ~ , T ~ )  i s
g iven  by r R  = I$ and T ( o  ) = ~ E C  f o r  each o R ~ E R  where P R P  
Sketched p roof :  Because o f  (SC) t h e  second component of 
~ ~ ( 4 . 0  ( 4 ) )  e q u a l s  nI f o r  any op t ima l  response  op o f  any oR&LR. R 
By backward i t e r a t i o n  one immediately s e e s  t h a t  y  i s  an  op t ima l  
response  of  each o  E E  i.e. Vp(oR,op) 5 Vp(oR,y) .  V ( .  , y )  R R' R.5 
i s  maximized by $ and,  more g e n s r a l l y .  VRr i ( . , y )  (i = 4,3 .2 ,1)  
a s  one can  see by backward i t e r a t i o n .  
Remark: I n  c a s e  of L+ > n  and (SC) b u t  v i o l a t e d  (C,R) t h e  I 
r e g u l a t o r  g e n e r a l l y  does  n o t  o b t a i n  t h e  p o s s i b l e  maximum pay- 
o f f  
P a r t  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s c a n  be g iven  i n  a  more i l l u s t r a t i v e  way. I n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  nI < L ( nR l e t  
+ 
c = - m .  ( u .  ( L  ) - u .  ( n I ) )  ( j  = R,P) . j 3 3 3 
m i s  assumed t o  be a c o n s t a n t  p o s i t i v e  f a c t o r .  I t  s p e c i f i e s  j 
t h e  weight  of  t h e  s e v e r e  consequences of a  judgment f o r  n o i s e  
r e d u c t i o n  which ha s  t o  be cons ide red  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  l a t e r  noise-  
producing a c t i v i t i e s .  A s h o r t  c a l c u l a t i o n  y i e l d s  t h a t  ( C , j )  is  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
+ 
The second theorem i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  nI < L  2-nR 
and rnRp7P 1 - PC1 - p ) t h e  r e g u l a t o r  p r e f e r s  t h e  compromise: 6  
$ ( 4 )  = ( n I , n I )  . I n  c a s e  of  n  < L+ < n  and m .P P < 1  - p ( 1  -P 6 )  I - R 1 7  - 
( j  = R,P), however, t h e  l a w s u i t  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a  judgment: (@,Y) ( 4 )  = 
+ + 
= (L ,L ; L + , L + ) .  
An e lement ray  c a l c u l a t i o n  shows t h a t  t h e  expec ted  d u r a t i o n  
I d  of  t h e  l a w s u i t  i s  d  = . Given d ,  c o n d i t i o n  ( C , j )  is  equ i -  
v a l e n t  t o  '6+'7 
The f o l l ow i n g  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  r e l evance  of  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
Le t  d  = 4 y e a r s ,  p = 0.9, and m - R - m~ = 10 .  Then ( C , j )  ( j  = R,P) 
i s  approx imate ly  g i v e n  by p  > 0 .03 .  Hence a  l a w s u i t  shou ld  7  
on ly  be f i l e d  and pursued t o  f i n a l  judgment i f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
f o r  a  judgment i n  f a v o r  of  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  i n  one y e a r  i s  n o t  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h r e e  p e r c e n t .  I f  p7 = 0 . 0 3  t h en  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  such a  judgment b e i n g  pronounced a t  a l l  i s  dp7 = 0 . 1 2 .  
A main e lement  of t h e  model i s  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t h e  
im pa c t e e s t  r e a c t i o n s  i n  s t anda rd  s e t t i n g .  Under c e r t a i n  assumpt ions  
t h e  model c o u l d  i d e n t i f y  t h e  impor t an t  a r e a s  i n  t h e ' d e c i s i o n  pro-  
c e s s  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  producer .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
a bo u t  o f f e r i n g  and a c c e p t i n g  o r  r e j e c t i n g  a  compromise t u r n e d  o u t  
t o  be  of  c r u c i a l  impor tance .  T h i s  d e c i s i o n  cou ld  be determined 
a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  model pa ramete r s  i n  which t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  outcome of  t h e  c o u r t  p roceed ings  can  p l a y  a  
major  r o l e .  
Model l i m i t a t i o n s  i n c l u d e  t h e  " s h o r t - s i g h t e d n e s s "  o f  t h e  i m -  
p a c t e e s t  r e sp o n se  which o n l y  c o v e r s  p r e s e n t  s t a n d a r d s  and n o i s e  
l e v e l s .  Consequent ly  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  of  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and t h e  pro- 
d uc e r  do n o t  i n c l u d e  commitments f o r l a t e r  t i m e  p e r i o d s ,  e . g .  i n  
t h e  form of q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d s .  The model r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e ,  how- 
ever, that such extensions are feasible, although at a substantial- 
ly greater effort. For example, strategies could be in the form 
of long-term noise reduction plans instead of short-term standards, 
and impactees' responses would take into account the nature of 
these plans. 
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